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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

WITNESS--COMP=TENCY OF AN ALLOPATHIC ExPERT IN THE FIE.D or HoMovOPATHY-OPINION ON VERY FACT THE JuRY MUST DETERMINE. Van Sickle v.
Doolittle, (Ia., 19x8), x69 N. W. 14T, was an action for malpractice against
a physician of the homceopathic school of medicine.
Upon the trial, a
physician of the allopathic school was called, and after testifying that he
was unskilled in the science of homcEopathy, was allowed to testify
that the treatment shown to have been given to the patient by defendant,
would produce no physiological effect, and that proper treatment required
the giving of such medicines as would produce such effect. ti, was held
error upon the ground that the defendant was called to treat the patient as a
homoeopathic physician and that his only obligati6n was to exercise such
care and skill as was common to practitioners of that school of medicine, and
the witness having been shown to be unskilled in the science of medicine as
practiced by that school, was not qualified to speak as expert in the field in-

NOTE AND COMMENT
volved. This would seem to be the only ruling which would avoid a fruitless
controversy in the court room between two schools of medicine whose apostles
would hesitate to agree on so simple' a propositiori as that the normal man
has one and not two livers.
It doubtless is one answer to such an action that the patient got what he
asked for, if he got treatment according to the standards of the school to
which the practitioner called belonged, and cannot complain that the result
was not what he had hoped, -and the court seems to have adopted this view.
But suppose the patient at the time of the treatment is non compos mentis
and cannot make the request for treatment; that the physician, discovering
his condition, gives the treatment out of a spirit of humanitarianism only,
and the patient recovering, brings his action to recover for claimed malpractice. Would he be entitled to recover, if he could satisfy a jury that the care
and skill exercised was not that common among practitionem of medicine in
that community? Would it be enough to defeat such i-tion that he did exercise that measure common to practitioners in his particular school, that of
homceopathy? Does the liability depend at all upon the fact that in the one
case the patient engaged for homcoopathic treatment and got it, and in the
other did not, and got it? Unless the physician is to be penalized for acting
on his humanitarian impulses it would seem reasonable to conclude that if
the physician used the care and skill common to practitioners of a school
which the law recognizes and licenses, he should be held harmless. The record does not indicate that the Good Samaritan's nostrum was diluted quite
to the extent of that shown to have been used in this case, but he seems not
only, not to have been condemned for his act, but to have been considered
worthy of imperishable memory.
One paragraph of the opinion reiterates the fallacious doctrine that an
expert witness cannot express an opinion upon the very question which the
jury must determine by its verdict. Why not? That the only question a jury
has to determine in a particular case is whether fact X exists has never been
thought to be a good objection to the testimony of A, who has had opportunity to personally observe whether it does exist, that it does or does not
exist. His testimony is received because it has a tendency to assist the jury
to a correct determination of the question at issue, that of the existence of
fact X.
For precisely the same reason should we say, that if the jury after having.
heard the testimony as to what were the circumstances accompanying the
death of A and finding what they were, is unable to tell what these conditions mean, it is proper to call one who is able to say that they mean that A
died of typhoid fcver, or that he died of arsenical poisoning, as the case may
be? As in the previous case the testimony is taken because it furnishes just
the information the jury lacks. Fenwick v. Bell, I C. & K. 312; Poole v. Dean,
152 Mass. 589; Snow v. R. Co., 65 Me. 231; Littlejohn v. Shaw, x59 N. Y. 188;
V. H. L.
Western Coal & M. Co., v. Berberich,36 C. C. A. 364.

